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Over the last two decades, university Institutional Review Boards 
(“IRBs”) have increasingly policed the scholarly and creative activities of 
faculty engaged in journalism, documentary filmmaking, creative and 
biographical writing, oral history, and legal research.1  Notwithstanding 
federal regulations and court decisions to the contrary, IRBs have required 
faculty to submit projects for approval or risk sanctions,2  the loss of 
resources,3 or the blacklisting of their work.4  Not surprisingly, most faculty 
 
*  Professor and Head of the Department of Media Studies, University of North Carolina – 
Greensboro; J.D. SUNY Buffalo School of Law.1  See generally AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF 
UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, RESEARCH ON HUMAN SUBJECTS: ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD (2006), www.aaup.org/AAUP/comm/rep/A/humansubs.htm 
[hereinafter AAUP Report]; THE CENTER FOR ADVANCED STUDY, IMPROVING THE SYSTEM 
FOR PROTECTING HUMAN SUBJECTS: COUNTERACTING IRB “MISSION CREEP” (2007) 
[hereinafter CENTER], 
https://hawaii.edu/research/files/Improving_the_System_for_Protecting_Human_Subjects_
CFAS_UI.pdf; Philip Hamburger, The New Censorship: Institutional Review Boards, 2004 
SUP. CT. REV. 271, 271-75, 290-91 (2004); Scott Jaschik, The Censor’s Hand: Author 
discusses his new book seeking the abolition of institutional review boards, INSIDE HIGHER 
EDUCATION, Jun. 3, 2015, https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/06/03/author-
discusses-new-book-flaws-institutional-review-boards (quoting Carl Schneider, IRBs have 
“steadily broadened and intensified their hold over research”); Scott Jaschik, Threat Seen to 
Oral History, INSIDE HIGHER EDUCATION, Jan. 3, 2008, 
https://insidehighered.com/news/2008/01/03/history [hereinafter Jaschik 2008]; Jack Katz, 
Comment on The Presidential Address: Toward a Natural History of Ethical Censorship, 41 
L. & SOC’Y REV. 797–810, 799 (2007) (arguing IRBs progressively regulate “legal academic 
studies, journalism, history, and large stretches of the humanities, including, on some 
campuses, creative writing and the visual arts); Robert L. Kerr, Unconstitutional Review 
Board: Considering a First Amendment Challenge to IRB Regulation of Journalistic 
Research Methods, 11 COMM. L. & POLICY 393, 403-08, 414-15 (2006) (enumerating 
examples and complaints of “mission creep”); David Wright, Creative Nonfiction and The 
Academy: A Cautionary Tale, 10 QUALITATIVE INQUIRY 202, 204-05 (2004); Caroline  H. 
Bledsoe et al., Regulating Creativity: Research and Survival In The IRB Iron Cage, 101 
NW. U.L. REV. 593, 595-596 (2007) (relating increase in faculty complaints of IRB 
censorship and overreach); Todd Zywicki, Institutional Review Boards as Academic 
Bureaucracies: An Economic and Experiential Analysis, NW. U. L. REV. 861, 881 (2007) 
(asserting that IRBs “tend[] to expand well beyond their originally designed scope and 
purpose”). 
 2  ROBERT L. KLITZMAN, THE ETHICS POLICE?: THE STRUGGLE TO MAKE HUMAN 
RESEARCH SAFE 294–95 (Oxford University Press 2015); CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE 
CENSOR’S HAND: THE MISREGULATION OF HUMAN-SUBJECT RESEARCH 61, 198–99 (2015 
MIT Press) (chronicling formal charges against faculty).  In one frequently cited case, a 
university accused a creative literature professor of “bad research practices,” because he had 
not obtained IRB approval for a story-writing exercise used in class and later discussed in an 
article on pedagogy.  The exercise required students to use creative writing techniques to 
write stories about themselves.  Hamburger, supra note 1, at 293; Wright, supra note 1, at 
204–05. 
 3  ZACHARY M. SCHRAG, ETHICAL IMPERIALISM, INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS AND 
THE SOCIAL  
SCIENCES, 1965–2009 127, 137–38 (2010); SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 174 (listing 
institutions that withdrew support). 
 4  Jaschik 2018, supra note 1; KLITZMAN supra note 2, at 278–79 (noting common 
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submit for approval.5 
IRBs maintain that they are simply carrying out their duties to review 
“all research”6  under the Federal Regulations for the Protection of Human 
Subjects (45 C.F.R. § 46), better known as the Common Rule.  The 
Common Rule regulates and sets ethical guidelines for certain types of 
“research involving human subjects:”7 before faculty can commence 
“research,” as defined by the Common Rule,8 an IRB must review9 and 
approve it.10  Many IRBs construe “research” expansively to encompass all 
methods and notions of academic inquiry, evidence-based scholarship, or 
expository creative activity.  Accordingly, if such activities collect 
information about or focus on people, IRBs and faculty often think they are 
deemed “human subjects research” requiring approval.11 
Although faculty generally do not dispute that journalism, non-fiction 
filmmaking and writing, and legal and historical investigation involve some 
form of research,12 they complain that as applied to these activities, the 
Regulations are inapt, unnecessary, and improperly restrictive.13  More 
specifically, they argue that: (a) because the Common Rule’s substantive 
requirements14 were designed for the biomedical and behavioral sciences, 
they do not translate15 or necessitate Rube-Goldberg-like workarounds to 
 
problems of publishing unapproved research); SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 59–60, 198–99. 
 5  SCHRAG, supra note 3, at 5, 143–50; Bledsoe, supra note 1, at 595–96; see also 
SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 199–200 (explaining that scholars submit and comply out of 
ignorance about Regulations).  Because IRB submission forms are designed for biomedical 
and behavioral science protocols, their informed consent requirements, and the equitable 
distribution of subject populations, faculty in other disciplines may need to change aspects 
of a project to fit it into and comply fully with an IRB submission form.  This may also 
require faculty to replace legally enforceable contracts, consent forms, and waivers (crafted 
by counsel or held valid by courts) with those drafted by lay IRBs. 
 6  45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2018).  
 7  45 C.F.R. § 46.102 (e)(1). 
 8  45 C.F.R. § 46.102 (l). 
 9  45 C.F.R. § 46.109.  
 10  45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (articulating criteria for approval). 
 11  See generally KLITZMAN, supra note 2, at 74–76, 99–105. 
 12  See infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text. 
 13  CENTER, supra note 1, at 3–5; Hamburger, supra note 1, at 274 (complaining that 
IRB rules abridge academic freedom); Jaschik 2018, supra note 1; Frank LoMonte, New 
Federal Rule Would Protect College Journalists from IRB Demands to Review Their 
“Research,” STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. (Dec. 27, 2015), 
http://www.splc.org/blog/splc/2015/12/hhs-considers-rule-protecting-journalism-irb; Moss, 
supra note 1, at 801– 02; Bledsoe, supra note 1, at 595–96.  
 14  This includes informed consent, disclosure of participant risks, pre-approved 
questions, weighing the likely harm posed by the research against its benefits, ensuring an 
equitable selection of research subjects. 
 15  AAUP Report, supra note 1; CENTER, supra note 1, at 3–6 (complaining that 
“research” and “human subject” are ambiguous when applied outside of biomedical and 
behavioral science and applying the Common Rule to humanistic, creative, and journalistic 
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implement;16 (b) applying the Regulations outside of the fields for which 
they were written leads to “inappropriate regulation and restriction;”17 (c) 
some provisions, such as those that limit human interactions to pre-
approved topics and questions, demand the destruction of original notes 
and recordings, and prohibit the disclosure of people’s names,18 are 
inconsistent with the fundamental nature and purposes of journalism, oral 
history, biographical writing, and nonfiction filmmaking;19 (d) existing 
disciplinary and professional codes better address the ethical concerns in 
these fields;20 and (e) the comparatively low risk of harm posed by these 
activities warrants exemption from or some less intrusive method of 
review.21 
I. ARTICLE OVERVIEW 
This article explores whether the noted academic and creative 
activities require IRB approval and why.  In doing so, it draws on the new 
 
inquiry leads to “inappropriate regulation and restriction”); Hamburger, supra note 1, at 
294; Jaschik 2008, supra note 1; Kerr, supra note 1, at 403–07; Moss, supra note 1, at 802. 
 16  SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 53–54, 63 (detailing how one scholar was required to 
interview herself about her notes, and another needed to grant consent to herself in order to 
reference her own past, present, and future writings and artifacts of her life). 
 17  CENTER supra note 1, at 3–5; Jaschik 2018, supra note 1 (“IRBs have become 
censors. . .  [who] decide what questions researchers can ask, how to ask them”); Kerr, 
supra note 1, at 403–07 (complaining that IRBs prohibit “questions that any other person 
can ask freely”); LoMonte, supra note 13; Moss, supra note 1, at 801–02.  
 18  Hamburger, supra note 1, at 294, 335; Kerr, supra note 1, at 403–07 (prohibiting 
“questions that any other person can ask freely”); LoMonte, supra note 13 (requiring pre-
approved questions in journalistic interviews); Moss, supra note 1, at 801–02; SCHNEIDER, 
supra note 1, at 53–54 (treating all research like biomedical research and, therefore, 
imposing those protocols and protections), 147–48 (requiring destruction of interviews and 
oral history recordings). 
 19  Citing the possible emotional stress to interviewees, IRBs have prevented oral 
historians from talking to people about their experiences during the Holocaust and “civil 
disobedience during social protest movements.”  CENTER, supra note 1, at 4; Jaschik 2008, 
supra note 1.  Several IRBs have expressed concerns that asking people about traumatic 
events will harm them. Elana Newman & Danny G. Kaloupek, The Risks and Benefits of 
participating in Trauma-Focused Research Studies, 17 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 383, 390 
(2004). 
 20  CENTER, supra note 1, at 4; Naomi Palosaari, Intellectual Property Rights and 
Informed Consent In American Indian Communities: Legal and Ethical Issues, 41 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 125, 148 (2016) (“Researchers in oral history, anthropology, linguistics, and 
folklore hold themselves to [their own disciplinary] standards for ethical research conduct”). 
For details regarding those standards, see id., at 148–151. 
 21  SCHRAG, supra note 3, at 143–160, 153–59 (providing an overview of Shopes’s and 
historians’ quest for express inclusion, then expedited review, then exemption), at 144–158 
(anthropologists, historians, sociologists, social folklorists, political scientists).  In 
describing the focus on obtaining “exempt” status, it appears that authors (or at least the 
people they describe) mistake research that is exempt from some of the Code’s standard 
provisions for activity that is not research or is excluded from the Code. 
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2018 Common Rule, agency guidance, federal legislation, and court 
decisions.  More broadly, this article aims to correct the pervasive 
misunderstandings regarding “human subjects’ research” that underlie this 
dispute.22 
To accomplish these goals in the most straightforward way possible, 
this article begins, somewhat unconventionally, by explaining a critical 
misunderstanding at the heart of the confusion, how it impacts IRB 
submission and review, and why it persists.  This is necessary not only to 
raze the existing foundation of erroneous information and contextualize the 
issue, but also to establish a sound framework for analysis. 
A. A Foundation of Misunderstanding 
The conflict regarding IRB oversight can be traced to a widely held, 
flawed premise.23  For the most part, IRB members and faculty have 
presumed that the aforementioned work and works are some form of 
research, and thus interpret the issue as whether these should be subjected 
to IRB review, given the Code’s science-valanced provisions and concerns.  
This, however, reflects a profound misunderstanding of the type of 
“research” “involving human subjects” that the Common Rule covers.24 
Fundamentally, whether activities must be IRB approved depends on 
whether they fall within the Common Rule and meet its definition of 
“research.”  If those activities do, they must be approved; if they do not, an 
IRB has no discretion to review them.25  As this article explains, the 
Common Rule does not cover all types of research, but only a particular 
species of it.26  As detailed below, scores of agency publications, court and 
administrative opinions, and past and present regulations, journalistic, 
biographical, historical, humanistic, and similar scholarly activities that 
focus on specific individuals do not constitute “research” under the 
 
 22  The answer will not be especially insightful to people who have read and understood 
the Code or supplemented their knowledge with OHRP Guidance documents, Opinion 
Letters, or court decisions.  Nonetheless, this article recognizes that a majority of the 
impacted constituencies have not. 
 23  See, e.g., SCHRAG, supra note 3, at ix–xi. 
 24  See generally, KLITZMAN, supra note 2, at 74–76, 99–105 (stating that IRBs mis-
define and misinterpret Code’s terms); SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 152–56 (describing 
ways that IRBs misunderstand and misapply Code’s terms and substitute personal opinion), 
199–200 (lacking knowledge of Code).  In turn, IRBs misconstrue what must be IRB-
approved. 
 25  Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 83 Fed. Reg. No. 14 (Jan. 22, 
2018); OHRP, Scholarly and Journalistic Activities Deemed Not to be Research: 2018 
Requirements, www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/requests-for-comments/draft-
guidance-scholarly-and-journalistic-activities-deemed-not-to-be-research/index.html 
[Hereinafter OHRP 2018]. 
 26  OHRP 2018, supra note 25; 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.108–09, 112. 
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Common Rule.27  As such, they do not need approval. 
Faculty and IRB members, however, have overlooked this authority in 
favor of their own idiosyncratic interpretations of “research,”28 which 
encompass more than what is covered by the Common Rule.29  As a result, 
IRBs wrongly review uncovered activities, but faculty do not assert the 
correct arguments to stop it.30  Instead, they raise previously rejected 
objections,31 or plead that their work warrants different treatment under the 
Code.32  Furthermore, because this argument is largely untethered to the 
source documents, more debate has not generated more clarity, but, instead, 
creates something of a centrifugal force taking people farther from the 
answer.33 
B. An Opportunity for Understanding 
Although previous United States Department of Human and Health 
Services (“HHS”), Office of Human Research Protections (“OHRP”), and 
judicial pronouncements have done little to correct these pervasive 
misunderstandings, we are at an inflection point.  First, in 2018, the Human 
 
 27  Scholarly and Journalistic Activities Deemed Not to be Research: 2018 
Requirements, https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/requests-for-
comments/scholarly-and-journalistic-activities-deemed-not-to-be-research-
guidance/index.html (last visited 2018). OHRP recently declared that IRB authority extends 
only to the types of research covered by the Common Rule. OHRP 2018, supra note 25.  
Therefore, while it is true that IRBs must approve all research covered by the Code even if 
doing so impedes it or is inferior to some other means, most of these activities do not qualify 
as “research,” let alone “human subjects’ research.”   
 28  See generally KLITZMAN, supra note 2, at 175–76 (failure to follow Code and OHRP/ 
HHS Guidance documents), 152–56 (misunderstand Code’s terms and substitute personal 
opinion and perceptions). 
 29  See KLITZMAN, supra note 2, at 99–104, 173–76, (mis-defining “research” and 
“general knowledge” and not following Regulations or Guidance documents defining these 
terms); SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 78–79. (IRBs misconstrue and reinterpret “research”). 
 30  SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 199 (stating faculty do not know enough about the Code 
to fight IRB overreach). 
 31  Additionally, corresponding to complaints unsuccessfully raised by researchers in 
the bio-medical and behavioral sciences, faculty also complain that IRBs impede research, 
elevate non-experts to arbiters of “good” research, require prior review of interview 
questions and topics, demand illogical changes to projects, and produce inconsistent results.  
Although these symptomatic concerns present differently in the context of journalism, 
biographical interviewing and writing, oral history collection, and documentation, they, too, 
were rejected or taken as an indication that projects of humanities and arts faculty needed to 
be closely monitored and scrutinized.  See KLITZMAN, supra note 2, at 9. 
 32  SCHRAG, supra note 3, at 143–160; Cf. Clarification of OHRP’s Position on Oral 
History Information (2015), https://research.utexas.edu/wp-
content/uploads/sites/3/2015/10/michael_carome_updated.pdf. 
 33  Those documents include: OHRP Opinion Letters, the regulation’s definition of 
“research,” statutes, court decisions, Guidance documents and Decision Charts from HHS 
(the agency that has regulated “human subjects” “research” since the 1970s). 
PODLAS (DO NOT DELETE) 4/4/2020  1:58 AM 
2020] THE NEW COMMON RULE  259 
Subject Research Regulations were amended, and, consistent with their 
implementation, institutions are presently revising their IRB policies and 
practices.  Second, in hopes of ending long-standing confusion about IRB 
review,34 the 2018 Common Rule added to the definition of “research” a 
subparagraph that states what does not constitute research (which HHS 
supplemented with a concurrent publication).35  Because faculty and IRBs 
are now focused on this issue and the answer is now beyond dispute, this 
article is uniquely important at this juncture. 
II.  FEDERAL REGULATION OF RESEARCH 
This article does not dispute the justifications for or substantive 
regulations governing “human subjects’ research,” but, rather, considers 
whether certain scholarly, creative, and journalistic activities are covered 
by those regulations.36  Understanding the legislative history and 
architecture of the Regulations, however, assists in understanding what 
activity is regulated (and, in turn, what is subject to IRB review).  Indeed, 
the titles and language that help illuminate their scope are obscured by the 
time they are implemented at the institutional level as the nondescriptly 
titled “Common Rule.” 
A. A Brief History of Federal Regulation 
In the 1970s, the U.S. government began devising principles and 
policies for conducting biomedical and behavioral research involving 
humans.37  In the summer of 1974, Congress passed the National Research 
Act: Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research.38  The National Research Act established: (1) the Office for the 
 
 34  OHRP 2018, supra note 25. 
 35  This is not a substantive change, but it does render the answer indisputable.  
Additionally, concurrent with the publication of the 2018 Common Rule, OHRP published a 
guidance reiterating that these are not “research,” explaining why they are not, and declaring 
that they are not subject to IRB review or any of the Code’s prophylactic provisions. 
 36  As such, it does not include the standard narrative of the scandals prompting 
regulation.  Such a detour risks mis-framing the issue.  For a comprehensive history of the 
events underlying regulation, see Center, supra note 1; Kerr, supra note 1, at 412; JAMES H. 
JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT (Free Press 1993). 
 37  This was prompted by the exposure of (yet another round of) a number of abuses of 
human research subjects.  See Klitzman, supra note 2, at 11–13; Schneider, supra note 1, at 
109–110. 
Some authors aver that the common invocation that scandals necessitated expanding IRB 
review was unfounded, and actually reflected moral panics about research rather than a 
plethora of actual instances of harmful research.  See Schneider, supra note 1, at 191–94; 
Will C. van den Hoonaard, Is Research-Ethics Review a Moral Panic?, 38 CAN.  REV. OF 
SOC. ANTHROPOLOGY 19, 25 (2001). 
 38  National Research Act: Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research, Pub. L. No. 93-348 (1974).  
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Protection of Research Risks39 (now the Office for Human Research 
Protection, Department of Health and Human Services40) to oversee and 
regulate biomedical and behavioral research on human subjects; and (2) the 
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical 
and Behavioral Research, a temporary body, to study problems associated 
with biomedical and behavioral research and propose guidelines for it.41 
In 1978, the National Commission authored Ethical Principles and 
Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research, better known 
as The Belmont Report.42  The Belmont Report articulated three ethical 
principles: respect for people, beneficence, and justice,43 to guide 
biomedical and behavioral research.44  Although heavy on principles, The 
Belmont Report was light on operational rules for conducting research.45  
Instead, the task of translating The Belmont Report’s principles into 
concrete regulations was assigned to its successor, the President’s 
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical 
and Behavioral Research.46 
 
 39  42 U.S.C.S. §300v-1–3 (providing for the establishment, duties, administration, 
funding, and termination of the President’s Commission, terminated Dec. 31, 1982). 
 40  In 1979, the Department Health, Education, and Welfare was divided into the 
Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Education.  See 20 U.S.C. 
§ 3508 (2019). 
 41  42 U.S.C. 6A §§ 289–300v-1 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No 10-43) (1993).  The 
National Commission met from 1974–1978.  Much of its work is recounted in DHEW, 
Institutional Review Boards: Report and Recommendations of the National Commission for 
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 43 Fed. Reg. 
54081, 56186 (Nov. 20, 1978).  
 42  DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, THE BELMONT REPORT (1979); 44 
Fed. Reg. 23192, 23193 (Apr. 17, 1979), 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/belmont.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2020).  
 43  To quote from the Report, these principles were: “(1) to avoid harm whenever 
possible, or at least to minimize harm; (2) to provide for fair treatment by avoiding 
discrimination between classes or among members of the same class; and (3) to respect the 
integrity of human subjects by requiring informed consent.”  The Belmont Report did not 
define (or clearly define) these principles, but in some ways treated them as conceptual 
labels. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 110–17.  And the “interim” principles were 
formulated in the context of research on fetuses, further underscoring the intended 
application of the provisions and their limitations.  THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS: RESEARCH ON THE FETUS, 76–127 (1975).  
 44  DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, supra note 42, at Part B. 
 45  See Finbarr W. O’Connor, The Ethical Demands of the Belmont Report, in 
DEVIANCE AND DECENCY: THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS (Carl B. 
Klockars & Finbarr W. O’Connor, eds.,1979) (opining on the application of ethical 
pronouncements to social science and humanistic research); SCHRAG, supra note 3, at 79–90 
(describing attempts to translate Belmont’s broader ethical suggestions into regulations). 
 46  The President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research was established on November 9, 1978. Its authority is 
articulated in 42 U.S.C. §300v and 42 U.S.C. §300v-1. 
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Perhaps the most enduring action regulating the conduct of human 
subject research was at the agency level.  In 1974, while Congress debated 
what would become the National Research Act, the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (“HEW”) (now HHS) preemptively enacted its 
own policy,47 thereafter codified as 45 C.F.R. § 46.48  In light of the 
impending legislation, it may have seemed pointless for Congress to create 
agency policy but, ultimately, it was what enabled HEW and HHS to 
establish and implement a template for regulating research, and allowed 
Commissions to spend several years studying the issue.49 
In fact, a few years later, when the President’s Commission50 began 
drafting its rules for Biomedical and Behavioral Research, it drew upon the 
HHS/OHRP policy already implemented.  Ultimately, in 1981, the 
President’s Commission’s regulations were integrated into51 and codified 
under 45 C.F.R. § 46.52 
 
 
 
 47  It was established May 30, 1974 (HRSA Internal Memo (1974)).  The internal HRSA 
memo calling for rules was entitled Biomedical Research and the Need for Public Policy. Id. 
at 8; see also Beno v. Shalala, 853 F. Supp. 1195, 1210–11 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (citing 120 
Cong. Rec. 31,596-97 (1974) (the Act “simply establishes in law and somewhat broadens 
the protection of human subjects of research and experimentation and similar activities 
which is already a part of HEW regulations . . . to include activities carried out by HEW 
itself”) (statement of Sen. Buckley)). 
 48  See HHS, Health Resources and Services Administration Program, Protection of 
Human Subjects Participating in Research Programs Conducted or Supported by HRSA 
Policy, HRSA Circular 03, V, available at www.hrsa.gov/humansubjects/policy/html; Office 
for the Protection of Research Risks (NIH), Summary of Basic Protections for Human 
Subjects (Dec. 23, 1997). 
 49  Although one author has cited this as evidence of a “power grab” or turf war, HEW 
had already been reviewing and regulating certain types of research. See Schneider, supra 
note 1, at 191–92; Will C. Van den Hoonaard, SEDUCTION OF ETHICS: TRANSFORMING THE 
SOCIAL SCIENCES, 137 (University of Toronto Press, 2011). 
 50  The Commission was directed to review of the adequacy and uniformity: (1) of the 
rules, policies, guidelines, and regulations of all Federal Departments and Agencies 
regarding the protection of human subjects of biomedical or behavioral research which such 
Departments and Agencies conduct or support, and (2) of the implementation of such rules, 
policies, guidelines, and regulations by such Departments and Agencies, including 
recommendations for legislation and administrative action.  Thereafter, it was to report on 
the protection of human subjects of biomedical and behavioral research, biennially to the 
President, Congress, and appropriate federal Departments and Agencies. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.   
 51  See 44 Fed. Reg. 47692 (Aug. 14, 1979). 
 52  In accordance with the Commission’s recommendation, the Model Federal Policy is 
based on subpart A of the HHS Regulations for The Protection of Human Research 
Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46; see HRSA, Circular, supra note 47, at 03, V. 
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B. The Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects: The 
Common Rule  
In 1991, more than a dozen other federal agencies and departments 
adopted 45 C.F.R. § 46,53 which became “The Federal Policy for the 
Protection of Human Subjects.”54  Because the policy is common among 
them, it is known as The Common Rule, but it is also referred to as the 
“Code,” “Policy,” and “Regulations.”55  The Department of Health and 
Human Services, along with the Office of Human Research Protection, 
which is under its charge, fulfils its statutory duty to regulate “biomedical 
or behavioral research involving human subjects”56 by administering these 
regulations.57 
Institutions and universities engaged in “research covered by th[e] 
policy”58 “and institutional review boards (IRBs) reviewing research 
subject to th[e] policy must comply with [the Common Rule].”59 
III. THE COMMON RULE AT THE UNIVERSITY LEVEL 
A. Institutional Review Boards 
Because it is not feasible for OHRP to directly oversee all of the 
nation’s institutions and researchers, the Common Rule requires60 that 
 
 53  As of 2018, the following agencies have adopted the Common Rule: Department of 
Homeland Security, Department of Agriculture, Department of Energy, National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, Department of Commerce, Social Security 
Administration, Agency for International Development, Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, Department of Justice, Department of Labor, Department of Education, 
Department of Veteran Affairs, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Health 
and Human Services, National Science Foundation, Department of Transportation, Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, and Consumer Product 
Safety Commission.  See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, Federal Policy for 
Protection of Human Subjects, https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-
policy/regulations/common-rule/index.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2020).  
 54  45 C.F.R. § 46.  Research on humans is regulated through two rules: 45 C.F.R. § 46 
(Health & Human Services), the focus here, and 21 C.F.R. § 50 of the FDA Code, which is 
applicable to research on experimental drugs and medical devices subject to FDA approval. 
 55  Because this article analyzes whether certain activities fall within the Common Rule, 
rather than its substantive rules for ethical research, those provisions are not detailed here. 
 56  42 U.S.C. § 289 (2019).  
 57  Regulations are typically effectuated as law. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 
U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, (1973).   
 58  45 C.F.R. § 46.103(a) (2020).  
 59  Id. (“conducted, supported, or otherwise subject to regulation by any Federal 
department or agency”). 
 60  42 U.S.C. § 289(a) (2019). The National Research Act provides for the creation of 
Institutional Review Boards “to review biomedical and behavioral research involving 
human subjects . . . .” 
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universities establish “local” IRBs61 to review “all research activities 
covered by the policy,”62 and ensure they satisfy its provisions.63  
Researchers desiring to conduct covered “research” must first obtain IRB 
approval64 and implement any modifications the IRB decrees.65  If the IRB 
denies approval, the research cannot proceed.66 
Despite being a lynchpin of the federal regulatory apparatus, most 
faculty were unaware of IRBs until the late 1990s to mid-2000s.67  After a 
number of high-profile lawsuits68 and federal enforcement actions,69 
universities became more vigilant about Common Rule compliance, and 
IRBs proliferated across campuses.70 
 
 61  KLITZMAN, supra note 2, at 212–13 (describing the local nature and relationship with 
the university).  The federal structure of “local” IRB review is modeled after the NIH 
Clinical Center’s “Clinical Research Committees” (which existed before federal government 
began regulating research conduct); LAURA STARK, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: IRBS AND THE 
MAKING OF ETHICAL RESEARCH (Univ. of Chicago Press 2012). 
 62  45 C.F.R. § 46.103(a) (2020).  
 63  45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2020) (listing requirements that IRB “shall determine . . . are 
satisfied”).  This includes minimizing and weighing risks of the research to subjects against 
its benefits, ensuring the subject’s privacy, requiring informed consent, and ensuring the 
research design is sound.  45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(1)(i) (2020); 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2) 
(2020).  These prescriptions are extrapolated from the Belmont Report’s central principles 
of beneficence, justice, and autonomy of human subjects.  DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, 
AND WELFARE, supra note 42.  
 64  45 C.F.R. § 46.109.  The federal review process then obligates IRBs and/ or their 
institutions to file with OHRP an “Assurance of Compliance” or Federal-Wide Assurance. § 
46.103. 
 65  45 C.F.R. § 46.108(a)(3)(iii). 
 66  45 C.F.R. § 46.109.  By one estimate, only 20% of proposals are approved as 
submitted.  See J. Nichols, The Canadian Model: A Potential Solution to Institutional 
Review Board Overreach, 6 AAUP J. ACAD. FREEDOM, no. 1, 2015, at 1, 3. 
 67  See generally SCHRAG, supra note 3 at 126.  
 68  Klitzman, supra note 2, at 15–18.  Holly Fernandez Lynch, Opening Closed Doors: 
Promoting IRB Transparency, 46 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 145, 154 n.78 (2018) (noting early 
2000’s increase in litigation, including that against IRBs and individual board members).  
See, e.g., Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001) (regarding 
infamous lead paint study in Baltimore City, dismissed by stipulation); see also M. M. 
Mello, D. M. Studdert, and T. A. Brennan, The Rise of Litigation in Human Subjects 
Research, 139 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 40, 40 (2003) (expressing concern that 
similar litigation would increase).  In reality, litigation by research subjects is relatively 
infrequent.  Lynch, supra note 68, at 154. 
 69  See Caroline H. Bledsoe, et al., Regulating Creativity; Research and Survival in the 
IRB Iron Cage, 101 NW. U. L. REV., No. 2, 593, 601–03 (2007) (discussing the withholding 
of federal funds as an alternative means of regulating IRBs); KLITZMAN, supra note 2, at 
178–79 (detailing federal actions shuttering research at some universities in 1999-2000 and 
the resulting fear it caused); Eliot Marshall, Shutdown of Research at Duke Sends a 
Message, 284 SCIENCE 1246 (May 21, 1999); SCHRAG, supra note 3, at 141 (regarding a 
sudden stream of “compliance oversight determination letters”); see also OHRP, OHRP 
Compliance Oversight Activities: Significant Findings and Concerns of Noncompliance, 
Oct., 12, 2005, www.hhs.gov/ohrp/compliance/findings.pdf  (report on compliance actions). 
 70  Jack Katz, Toward a Natural History of Ethical Censorship, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
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B. Local IRB Decision-making 
If not for outsourcing to local IRBs, research review would require a 
distended bureaucracy,71 millions in resources, and longer review periods.  
The tradeoff for ease and expediency, however, is that, because the system 
relies on unsupervised lay people applying administrative regulations,72 
mistakes occur.73  Additionally, decisions issued by IRBs are widely 
divergent and inconsistent,74 and because IRBs operate as closed systems 
without external appeal, there is no mechanism for identifying and 
correcting mistakes.75  This permits misunderstandings to thrive and 
become de facto policy.76 
Among the more troubling revelations salient here, research shows 
that university IRB members often misinterpret or misapply the Code’s 
provisions,77 substitute their own interpretations for the Common Rule’s 
definitions,78 and unknowingly stray beyond their authority.79  This is the 
case with research involving human subjects. 
C. What May IRBs Review? 
The Common Rule requires that any “covered” “research”80 be 
reviewed and approved by an IRB.81  Conversely, IRBs are obligated to 
 
797, 799 (2007); Marshall, supra note 69. 
 71  See KLITZMAN, supra note 2, at 337–38 (describing perceived benefits of local 
oversight and problems with centralized systems). 
 72  SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 68–69, 154–56 (discussing the intensification of 
currently existing judicial due process issues when lay people, as opposed to expert judges, 
attempt to discern and apply federal regulations in IRBs). 
 73   KLITZMAN, supra note 2, at 63 (relating that IRBs at prominent institutions have 
misinterpreted the Regulations.); see also SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 78–97 (noting survey 
of IRBs that showed IRBs correctly answered only 55% of questions regarding content 
covered in OHRP/ HHS Guidance Documents). 
 74  See SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 71–74, 78–97; KLITZMAN, supra note 2, at 7–8, 60; 
SCHRAG, supra note 3, at 168–69. 
 75  See SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at xxix (contending that IRBs make poor decisions 
because they are unaccountable). 
 76  SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at xxix. 
 77  See notes 72–74, supra, notes 83, 84, infra.  
 78  Klitzman, supra note 2, at 63, 74–76; SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 78–79 (relating 
that studies reveal that IRBs misunderstand the Code’s definition of “research”), 93–95 
(IRB members often lack familiarity with Code). 
 79  Zywicki, supra note 1, at 881.  Indeed, federal agencies have been surprised by how 
IRBs have attempted to expand both their and the Regulation’s scope. KLITZMAN, supra 
note 2, at 183–84. 
 80  45 C.F.R. § 46.109(a). 
 81  See supra note 63 and accompanying text.  45 C.F.R. §46.111 (listing requirements 
that IRB “shall determine . . . are satisfied”). IRB review includes minimizing and weighing 
risks of the research to subjects against its benefits, §46.111(a)(2), ensuring the subjects’ 
privacy, § 46.111(a)(7), requiring informed consent, § 46.111(a)(4), and ensuring the 
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review and approve any research covered by the Common Rule.  Disputes 
regarding what is subject to IRB approval82 stem from confusion about, or 
more accurately, a failure to comprehend, what qualifies as “research” 
under the Common Rule.83  Because faculty and IRBs misconstrue which 
“research” is covered,84 they misconstrue which activities must be 
approved. 
Ironically, this occurs not because the word “research” is alien, but 
because it is familiar.  The familiarity of the word does not signal, and 
faculty and IRBs do not realize, the term possesses a unique meaning in the 
context of the Common Rule.85  Accordingly, IRB members overlook the 
Common Rule’s definition, and interpret it colloquially or as a reflection of 
whatever methods, practices, and products their disciplines deem 
“research.”86  This is not surprising considering faculty and IRB members 
are not legal scholars versed in administrative law and statutory 
construction.87  These interpretations, however, transmogrify “research” 
into something different than what is covered by the Common Rule.  
Indeed, it has led IRBs to assert authority over a wide variety of academic 
undertakings and modes of inquiry including: journalistic investigation, 
 
research design is sound, § 46.111(a)(1)(i).These prescriptions are extrapolated from the 
Belmont Report’s central principles of beneficence, justice, and autonomy of human 
subjects.  The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical 
and Behavioral Research, Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human 
Subjects of Research (Belmont Report), DHEW Publication OS78-0012, Washington, D.C., 
September 30, 1978.   
 82  See, e.g., SCHRAG, supra note 3, at ix-xi. 
 83  OHRP 2018 (“Scholarly and Journalistic Activities Deemed Not to be Research”)  
OHRP, 83 Federal Register 28497; see KLITZMAN, supra note 2, 173–76 (IRBs do not 
follow OHRP/ HHS Guidance, and are confused about what constitutes research and exempt 
research.). 
 84  KLITZMAN, supra note 2, at 99–104 (discussing common confusion of “research” and 
“general knowledge” as terms of art); SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 78–79 (enumerating 
evidence that IRBs misconstrue definition of “research” or believe it is subject to IRB 
interpretation). 
 85  KLITZMAN, supra note 2, at 74–76 (detailing IRB members’ lack of understanding of 
and failure to apply Code’s terms). Schneider, supra note 1, at 68, 97–105 (same).  
Counterintuitively, a fabricated term (such as SINCOGENK, standing for “systematic 
investigation designed to contribute to generalizable knowledge”, the Code’s definition of 
research) might have prevented misunderstandings, because it would signal its inimitability 
and force people to read the Common Rule’s definition.   
 86  OHRP 2018 (“Scholarly and Journalistic Activities Deemed Not to be Research”) 
OHRP 2018, supra note 25; see Katz, supra note 1, at 86; see KLITZMAN, supra note 2, at 
74–76, 99–102 (stating that IRB members substitute opinion for the Code’s definitions and 
fail to follow OHRP/ HHS Guidance documents); SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 152 (stating 
IRBs rely on personal experience and intuition to define terms). 
 87  SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 97–105.  It is nonetheless dispiriting that scholars do not 
read the source material or HHS/ OHRP Guidance documents. 
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oral history collection and documentation,88 non-fiction filmmaking and 
biographical writing, creative and reconstructive non-fiction writing,89 oral 
history collection and documentation,90 and legal research.91  Furthermore, 
when an IRB wrongly asserts authority over a scholarly, journalistic, or 
creative activity, it reinforces that authority.  Every submission becomes 
proof that such projects must be submitted and becomes precedent that 
IRBs have the authority to review them. 
IV. “RESEARCH” COVERED BY THE COMMON RULE 
Whether an activity requires IRB approval hinges on whether it 
constitutes “research” under the Common Rule.  Fundamentally, it is 
critical to understand that the Common Rule does not cover every 
investigational, scholarly, or research-oriented undertaking involving 
people.  Instead, it applies only to a particular type of research “involving 
human subjects.”92 
A. “Research” Defined 
As is often the case with legal language, the Code defines “research” 
in a specific way: 
Research means a systematic investigation, including 
research development, testing, and evaluation, designed to 
develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge.  
Activities that meet this definition constitute research for 
 
 88  See, e.g., CENTER, supra note 1; Robert L. Kerr, supra note 1, at 403–07; SCHRAG, 
supra note 3, at 137–38. 
Appearing to extend their historical rivalry to IRB review, both Duke University and the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill implemented policies requiring IRB review of 
student journalism projects.  Hamburger, supra note 1, at 293–94.  And UNC Chapel Hill 
threatened to withhold a degree from a journalism student who had requested printed 
material, by phone, for a project. Jack Katz, Ethical Escape Routes for Underground 
Ethnographers, 33 American Ethnologist 501 (Nov. 2006); AAUP, Protecting Human 
Beings, Academe: Bulletin of the AAUP, May-June 2001, at 55, 59. 
 89  Hamburger, supra note 1, 293–94; Katz, supra note 1, at 799 (“creative writing and 
the visual arts”); Wright, supra note 1, at 204 (creative and biographical writing).  Narrative 
research/Narrative studies typically involve biographical study of an individual or collecting 
several people’s accounts of a specific event or time period. Shaun B. Spencer, Using 
Empirical Methods to Study Legal Writing, 20 Legal Writing 141, 172 (2015). 
 90  AAUP Report, supra note 1; Center, supra note 1, at 4; Katz, supra note 1, at 799; 
OHRP 2018, supra note 25. 
Citing possible emotional stress to interviewees, IRBs have prohibited oral historians and 
documentarians from talking with Holocaust survivors or protestors engaged in “civil 
disobedience.” Center, supra note 1, at 4; Jaschik 2015, supra note 1. 
 91  Cf. OHRP 2018, supra note 25 (noting that questions about whether legal research is 
“research”). 
 92  45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a). 
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purposes of this policy. . . . 93 
The 2005, 1992, and 1981 Common Rules share this definition.94 
In 2018, to rectify the longstanding misunderstandings discussed in 
this article, the Code95 added to this definition a paragraph explicitly stating 
that:96 
For purposes of this part, the following activities are 
deemed not to be research: 
 
(1) Scholarly and journalistic activities (e.g., oral history, 
journalism, biography, literary criticism, legal research, 
and historical scholarship), including the collection and use 
of information that focus directly on the specific 
individuals about whom the information is collected . . . .97 
Subparagraph (1) is not a substantive change in policy, but a 
clarification.98  In 2011, as part of the inter-agency reassessment of the 
Common Rule, HHS sought public comment.99  Several organizations 
asked that “research” be clarified or that the Code exclude certain 
activities.100  As a result, the 2018 Code added subparagraph (1), hoping 
that people would finally understand what constituted “research” under the 
Code.101 
 
 93  45 C.F.R. § 46.102(I). 
 94  The 1981, 1992, and 2005 Common Rules also define research as “a systematic 
investigation, including research development, testing and evaluation, designed to develop 
or contribute to generalizable knowledge.” 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(l). 
 95  The new 2018 Common Rule became effective July 2018.  Federal Policy for the 
Protection of Human Subjects: Six Month Delay of the General Compliance Date of 
Revisions While Allowing the Use of Three Burden-Reducing Provisions during the Delay 
Period.  83 Fed. Reg. 28497, 28499 (Jun. 19, 2018). 
 96  Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149, 7261 (Jan. 
19, 2017). 
 97  45 C.F.R. § 46.102(l)(1). 
 98  OHRP, 83 Fed. Reg. 28497. 
 99  Id. 
 100  Id.; see also CENTER, supra note 1, at 3–5 (complaining that “research” and “human 
subject” are ambiguous); SCHRAG, supra note 3, at 143–61 (recounting confusion among 
anthropologists, historians, sociologists, social folklorists, political scientists, and entreaties 
to clarify).  For decades, IRBs and faculty ignored existing HHS/OHRP Guidance 
Documents, Opinion Letters, and court decisions explaining the limited nature of “Common 
Rule” “research.”   
 101  On September 8, 2015, HHS and 15 other federal departments and agencies 
published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking which presented the proposed revisions.  80 
Fed. Reg. 53931 (Sept. 8, 2015).  On January 19, 2017, HHS/OHRP published the final 
revised Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, with implementation to begin 
(and a general compliance mandate for most provisions) July 19, 2018.  82 Fed. Reg. 7149 
(July 19, 2018). 
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B. Characteristics of “Research” 
There are two components to Common Rule research.  First, the 
investigation is designed to systematically collect data or information (be it 
quantitative or qualitative) or test a hypothesis.102  Although this is typified 
by an experimental protocol,103 it also includes methodologies such as 
participant observation and ethnographic study.104 
Second, the primary objective is to develop or contribute to 
“generalizable knowledge.”105  This does not mean that the undertaking or 
its end-product contributes to others’ knowing things or collects “factual 
information” of general interest.  Instead, “generalizable knowledge” is that 
which can be applied to other situations beyond the parameters of the 
specific undertaking, extended to other groups, or used to draw broader 
generalizations about phenomena or populations.106  Hence, its purpose is 
to discover or obtain information and extend this information to other 
people and situations.107 
By contrast, activities “that focus directly on the specific individuals 
about whom information is collected and used, without extending that 
information to draw generalizations about other individuals or groups,” are 
not “research.”108  For example, documentaries, biographical or 
reconstructive nonfiction books, journalistic investigations, oral history 
collections, literary criticisms, and legal research and case studies do not—
 
 102  OHRP 2018, supra note 25; Letter from Michael Carome, Associate Director for 
Regulatory Affairs, OHRP, to Linda Shopes and Donald Ritchie (Sep. 22, 2003), available 
at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/hs/Oral_History.doc; updated Clarification of OHRP’s 
Position on Oral History Information (2015), 
https://research.utexas.edu/wpcontent/uploads/sites/3/2015/10/michael_carome_updated.pdf
. 
 103  G.J. Annas, Questing for Grails: Duplicity, Betrayal and Self-deception in 
Postmodern Medical Research, 12 J. CONTEMPORARY HEALTH L. & POL’Y 297, 315 (1996). 
 104  OHRP 2018, supra note 25. 
 105  45 C.F.R. § 46.102(l); OHRP 2018, supra note 25; cf. Mayfield v. Dalton, 901 F. 
Supp. 300 (D. Hawaii 1995). 
 106  OHRP 2018, supra note 25; Sims v. Central Intelligence Agency, 479 F. Supp. 84 
(D.D.C 1979).  The phrase was added to distinguish hypothesis-testing and experimentation, 
which are research, from humanistic inquiry, creation, professional practice, and therapeutic 
treatment which are not.  OHRP Clarification (2015), supra note 102; see Vodopest v. 
MacGregor, 913 P.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. Wa. 1996). 
 107  Amy L. Fairchild, Population-Based Surveillance and Research: Dealing With 
Humpty Dumpty: Research, Practice, and the Ethics of Public Health Surveillance, 31 J. L. 
MED. & ETHICS 615 (2003) (Robert Levine, who drafted the definition for the National 
Commission, required the activity be “done with the intent” of generating new knowledge); 
see also ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 3 (2d ed. 1988) 
(explaining that research refers to categories of activities designed to contribute to 
generalizable knowledge, which consists of theories, principles, or relationships, and can be 
corroborated by accepted scientific observation). 
 108  OHRP 2018, supra note 25. 
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and are not primarily intended to—develop generalizable knowledge.109  
Accordingly, these activities are not “research.”110  This is true even if they 
“collect and present factual information to support their presentation of the 
[person’s] character,” provide “evidence-based portrayal[s] of the 
individuals involved,” or are motivated to better understand people and 
events.111  Indeed, as far back as 2003, an OHRP Opinion Letter stated that, 
even though open-ended biographical, journalistic, and “oral history 
interviewing”112 seek to better understand people and events, they are not 
primarily intended to produce or contribute to generalizable knowledge, 
and are not, therefore, “research.”113  OHRP subsequently republished this 
in 2015 and expounded on it in a publication coinciding with the roll out of 
the 2018 Common Rule.  It is also reflected in subparagraph (1) of the 2018 
Code. 
Because the undertaking’s primary motivation must be to contribute 
to generalizable knowledge, courts have held that something may be 
“research” in one instance, but not in another.114  For example, if a doctor 
uses a non-standard “experimental” medical intervention to collect 
 
 109   OHRP 2018, supra note 25.  Compare Freeman v. NBC, 80 F.3d 78 (2nd Cir. 1996) 
(describing broadcast news-writing as “inventive and imaginative”), with Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977) (stating films are artistic works that entertain), 
and Candelaria v. Spurlock, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51595 (E.D.N.Y. July 3, 2008) (noting 
documentary films educate the public), and Huckabee v. Time Warner Entertainment 
Group, 19 S.W.3d 413 (Sup. Ct. Tx. 2000) (illustrating that documentary film uses 
information to tell a story). 
 110  Gathering information about a few people, such as participant observation or 
ethnographic study, with the purpose of revealing or discerning something about the beliefs 
or customs of the community or group to which those people belong (rather than to just 
obtain information about or collect evidence to expose the specific people) would meet the 
definition of “research.” OHRP 2018, supra note 25. 
 111  OHRP 2018, supra note 25; OHRP Clarification (2015), supra note 102. 
 112  This was in response to queries from Oral History Association and the American 
Historical Association. Historian Michael Carhart was one of the few in the discipline who 
correctly stated that history is not a science, is not predictive, and does not seek to produce 
“generalizable knowledge,” so does not meet the definition of “research,” hence is excluded. 
SCHRAG, supra note 3, at 154–55. 
 113  OHRP Clarification (2015), supra note 102; Carome Letter, 2003, supra note 102.  
OHRP added that these activities are not systematic in the way of “research” contemplated 
by the Code. OHRP Opinion Letter. 
 114  As applied to the types of creative activity here, filming a dozen people on an island 
for a television reality competition show, one’s video travelogue, as footage for a 
documentary film about a few (or all) of those people, or as evidence of what portends to 
become “Lord of the Flies” anarchy is not primarily motivated to collect information to be 
applied to or generalized to other people or populations; It is to make a TV show, 
travelogue, film, or evidence for future litigation and blackmail. Moreover, it is specific to 
those people, so is not “research.”  Filming those same people on the same island  in order 
to document group dynamics with the intention of learning about group dynamics generally 
or to see how members of different genders expressed leadership, in order to use this 
evidence to espouse a theory of gender and leadership applicable to others, is research. 
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information about its efficacy or treatment effects in an effort to apply what 
is learned to pharmaceutical development or broader patient populations, it 
is “research.”115  If a physician uses that same experimental—i.e., non-
standard, intervention116—to treat a patient, it is not.117  For example, in 
Mayfield v. Dalton, the Department of Defense (“DOD”) collected, tested, 
and catalogued DNA of military personnel.  The court held that this was 
not “research” because the DNA was collected in case the DOD needed to 
identify someone’s remains, rather than to develop “generalizable 
knowledge about DNA, the traits of service personnel, or anything else.”118 
C. Activities that are Not “Research” 
It is clear that many things colloquially called “research”—finding 
and reading journal articles, interviewing people, querying library 
databases, “Googling,” obtaining archival footage, and comparing hotel 
prices on Trivago—are not the species of “research” covered by the 
Common Rule.119  These activities, as opposed to “research,” are not 
intended to discover information or explanations to be generalized to other 
situations or populations. 
Furthermore, the activities on which this article focuses also do not 
meet the Code’s definition of “research.”  Underscoring this, in 2018, the 
Office of Human Research Protections published supplementary materials 
in conjunction with the implementation of the Revised Common Rule.  
OHRP explained that, because the main purpose of oral history, journalism, 
 
 115  Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 518 U.S. 
137 (1996) (noting that consent is needed in experimentation); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 
F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986) (same); cf. Sims v. Central Intelligence Agency, 479 F. Supp. 84, 
84, 91 (D.D.C. 1979) (explaining that CIA’s MK-ULTRA research program failed to obtain 
consent from subjects). 
 116  In this context, “experimental” does not designate a research “experiment,” but 
something that is not a standard treatment.  Indeed, health insurers distinguish between 
“experimental” and “standard” treatments.  Dale L. Moore, An IRB Member’s Perspective 
on Access to Innovative Therapy, 67 ALB. L. REV. 560, 561–62 (1994). 
 117  Whitlock v. Duke University, 637 F. Supp. 1463, 1467–68 (M.D.N.C. 1998) (noting 
the goal of nontherapeutic experimentation is to discover and collect data); see also Jay 
Katz, Human Experimentation and Human Rights, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 7, 14–15 (1993) 
(comparing ethical duties of doctors towards patients with those of clinical researchers 
toward subjects and patient-subjects). 
 118  Mayfield v. Dalton, 901 F. Supp. 300, 305 (D. Haw. 1995); see also State v. Jensen, 
373 N.W.2d 902 (N.D. 1985) (detailing that a urinalysis program implemented by a prison 
to deter drug use and trafficking was not “research” because its main purpose was not to 
produce generalizable knowledge). 
 119  There is a universe of scholarly and creative activities and works that faculty, 
academic and professional organizations, Promotion and Tenure Guidelines, funders, 
conferences, and publishers call “research,” and then there is the much smaller category of 
what qualifies as Common Rule “research.”  The latter is covered by the Common Rule and 
IRB review; the former is not.   
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biography, literary criticism, and legal research “is to focus on specific 
individuals” (and “not to extend the activity’s findings to other individuals 
or groups”), they are not “research.”120  Moreover, these activities fall 
within new subparagraph (1) which explicitly states they are not Common 
Rule “research.” Consequently, they do not require IRB approval.121 
V. OTHER MISUNDERSTANDINGS CONTRIBUTING TO CONFUSION AND IRB 
OVERREACH 
Misunderstandings about “research” are supported and compounded 
by misreading other sections of the Code.  Because this article aims to 
correct misconceptions about what activities that require IRB approval, 
these misunderstandings require attention. 
A. “Exempt Research” 
Section 46.104(d) enumerates certain activities that are “human 
subjects’ “research,” but have been designated as exempt from a full 
standard IRB review.122  Instead, these receive “limited review.”123  A 
researcher claiming an exemption submits the project to the IRB,124 which 
then confirms that the research falls within the exemption and signs-off.125 
Importantly, § 46.104 is not an exhaustive listing of everything that is 
not “research” or covered by the Common Rule—after all, activities that 
are not “research” are not covered by the Code, so they do not need to be 
exempted from it.126 
 
 120  OHRP 2018, supra note 25; OHRP Clarification (2015), supra note 102; Carome 
Letter (2003), supra note 102. 
 121  Aside from what qualifies as “research,” The Common Rule applies only to 
“research” regulated by a federal department or agency.  45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a).  Therefore, 
even if an activity qualifies as “research,” it may not be subject to IRB approval, unless 
Congress has specially given an agency the responsibility for regulating it as “research.”  
Documentary filmmaking, journalistic, biographical writing, and other artistic, creative, and 
scholarly activities addressed in this article are not specifically regulated by a federal 
agency, let alone by one empowered to regulate them as “research activity.” In fact, as 
explained below, attempts to do so would likely run afoul of the First Amendment.  
Accordingly, even activity within these spheres that might qualify as “research” is not 
“research” that a federal agency regulates as research activity; in turn it would not fall 
within the Common Rule. 
 122  45 C.F.R. § 46.104(d). 
 123  45 C.F.R. § 46.104(d). 
 124  Hence, a researcher claiming an exemption is acknowledging that the activity is 
“research.” 
 125  45 C.F.R. § 46.104(d)(2)(iii), (d)(3)(i)(C), (d)(7), d(8) (stating exemptions, process, 
and that exemption is conditioned on limited review). 
 126  To illustrate, every state has laws or regulations requiring that cars be registered. See, 
e.g., S.C. Code § 56-3-110 (vehicles to be registered).  These typically exempt from 
registration certain categories of vehicles or owners. See, e.g., S.C. Code, § 56-3-120 
(Exemptions from registration), § 56-3-140 (Exemption of certain professional racing cars).  
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Many do not realize that the Common Rule applies only to a certain 
type of “research,” and others read the term “exempt” out of context.  As a 
result, these individuals often think the “exempt” section enumerates 
everything that is not “research” or that does not require IRB review (rather 
than stating which “research” is exempt from the standard review process).  
In turn, they mistakenly conclude that activities not listed, must be 
reviewed (and are research). 
In fact, The American Historical Association (“AHA”) and its sister 
organizations have long been mired in this misunderstanding.  In 2007, 
attempting to protect its methods of inquiry from unnecessary IRB 
intrusion,127 the AHA lobbied OHRP to add oral history activities to the 
“expedited review” category.128  This category enumerates certain “low 
risk” “research” that does not require a full board meeting for review, 
thereby expediting its review.  Nonetheless, expedited review applies only 
to “research.”  Therefore, by asking to include activities in the “expedited” 
category, the AHA self-designated them “research.” 
After succeeding, the AHA asked that these be moved into the 
“exempt” category.129  Although preferable to expedited review, this 
reveals the same misunderstanding; by advocating that these activities be in 
the “exempt” category, these organizations incorrectly designated them 
“research.”  Oral history activities, however, generally do not qualify as 
“research,” and, therefore, do not need to be reviewed or approved.130  
 
Although they would not be found in any of these registration exemptions, a two-inch 
Matchbox car, Bumblebee Transformer that turns into a VW bug, and D battery-operated 
plastic car for a Barbie doll do not need to be registered.  This is because, as a threshold 
matter, they do not meet the definition of “car.”  In turn, because they are not covered by the 
registration laws, they do not need to be exempted from them. 
 127   Kerr, supra note 1, at 406–07. 
 128  45 C.F.R. § 46.110.  Presaging this, in March 1998, the then-president of the Oral 
History Association  requested on behalf of the Oral History Association, the American 
Historical Association, the Organization of American Historians, and the American Studies 
Association, that oral history interviewers using informed consent procedures and forms 
eligible for expedited review, and, that oral history interviewers not using these procedures 
and forms be subjected to full IRB review.  American Association of University Professors, 
Institutional Review Boards and Social Science Research (2000), 
https://www.aaup.org/report/institutional-review-boards-and-social-science-research.  In 
November 1998, OHRP added oral history to the list of activities eligible for expedited 
review, HHS, “Protection of Human Subjects: Categories of Research That May be 
Reviewed by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) Through an Expedited Review 
Procedure,” 63 Fed. Reg. 60364-60367 (9 Nov. 1998). 
 129  Jaschik 2008, supra note 1. 
 130  “Oral history refers both to a method of recording and preserving oral testimony and 
to the product of that process.  It begins with an audio or video recording of a first-person 
account made by an interviewer with an interviewee (also referred to as narrator), both of 
whom have the conscious intention of creating a permanent record to contribute to an 
understanding of the past.  A verbal document, the oral history, results from this process and 
is preserved and made available in different forms to other users, researchers, and the 
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Therefore, this was either a mystifyingly bad strategy to keep IRBs at bay 
or an indication of a profound misunderstanding of what “exempt” and 
“research” mean.131  Additionally, the desire to include oral history in the 
Code may have been a misguided attempt to obtain official recognition that 
it was on par with research activities in the sciences.132  Indeed, the main 
advocate for these changes feared that if historians and related disciplines 
said they did not conduct Common Rule “research” (or if their activities 
were expressly excluded from the definition of “research”), then funding 
agencies would be hesitant to award them research grants.133  While the 
constraints of this article prevent a full accounting of the ways this is 
intellectually flawed, that an activity is not the kind of research covered by 
the Common Rule, or does not meet its definition of “research,” does not 
mean it is not research for some other purpose or context.  Conversely, 
referring to it as research does not make it so. 
B. The Scope of IRB Authority and Review of Uncovered Activity 
IRBs may also review uncovered activities because they misconstrue 
the scope of their regulatory authority and the nature of their duty to protect 
human research subjects and institutions.134 
Some IRBs simply think it prudent to review the ethical dimensions of 
creative processes and professional practices.135  They reason that the 
Common Rule’s mandate to review “research” does not preclude them 
from also reviewing activities that are not “research,” or note that the Code 
allows IRBs to impose enhanced protections on “research.”136  This 
 
public.”  The Oral History Association, Principles and Best Practices for Oral History 
(2009), http://www.oralhistory.org/about/principles-and-practices. 
 131  Independent of this, the ethics of sacrificing some uncovered faculty activity to 
advantage other uncovered faculty activity (see note 126)—in the pursuit of upholding 
research ethics—is ironic.  More likely, this was the result of a profound lack of 
understanding. 
 132  At some level, this may have reflected debate within the discipline about oral 
history’s methods and their status as “creditable” scholarship.  During this period, the 
discipline was debating the practice of oral history.  Historians favoring traditional methods 
were skeptical of oral history: They criticized its methodologies as too dependent on 
memory and subject to revision, and asserted it was not research.  Jennifer Howard, Oral 
History Under Review, Chronicle of Higher Education (Nov. 10, 2006) 
https://www.chronicle.com/article/Oral-History-Under-Review/6566.  Oral historians 
argued that their methods were legitimate, and their work constituted research, comparable 
to traditional scholarly activity.  The insistence that oral history was research (as understood 
by the discipline) may have manifested as broader movement to ensure that everyone, 
including OHRP, deem it research. 
 133  SCHRAG, supra note 3, at 155 (citing comments by Shopes). 
 134  See KLITZMAN, supra note 2, at 323 (demonstrating that some IRBs are overly 
cautious or believe their duty is to protect the university). 
 135  KLITZMAN, supra note 2, at 8; SCHRAG, supra note 3, at 167. 
 136  KLITZMAN, supra note 2, at 174. 
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misreads the Code and overlooks its limitations on IRB authority. 
Although situated within their respective universities, IRBs derive 
their authority from the Code.137  Their authority is also constrained by 
federal law and code.138  IRBs are authorized to review only the category of 
research covered by the Common Rule.139  Activities “not included in the 
[Common Rule’s] definition of ‘research’ . . . do not fall within the scope 
of the regulations” or IRB purview.140  Hence, IRBs have no discretion to 
review “non-Common Rule” undertakings, even if academics or funders 
refer to them as research.141 
Furthermore, while an IRB can impose enhanced safeguards on 
certain types of covered “research,” it cannot use a desire for increased 
safety as a justification to control activities that are not covered 
“research.”142  IRBs implement federal agency regulations, and are bound 
by the agency’s interpretation of them, unless clearly contradicted by 
statute or constitutional provision.143  Of relevant here, HHS states that 
“human subjects research under . . . the Common Rule,” does not include 
journalistic investigation and interviewing, legal research and case studies, 
literary criticism and creative writing, biographical filmmaking and 
writing, and historical scholarship.144  As this is perfectly consistent with 
the underlying statutory authority, IRBs and universities cannot go beyond 
this. 
Moreover, regulations cannot exceed their underlying statutory 
authority.145  If Congress’ intent is clear, “that is the end of the matter; for 
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress.”146  Here, the underlying statutes speak of 
and authorize regulation of only biomedical and behavioral research, to wit: 
The National Research Act: Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical 
 
 137  KLITZMAN, supra note 2, at 212–13 (describing local nature and relationship with 
university). 
 138  42 U.S.C. Ch. 6A; 45 CFR §46.112. 
 139  OHRP, Fed. Reg. (July 2018). 
 140  Id. 
 141  Id. Furthermore, regulations cannot exceed their underlying statutory authority. See 
Roberts v. United States, 44 Ct. Cl. 411 (Fed. Cl. 1909). 
 142  SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 2. 
 143  Smith v. United States, 170 U.S. 372 (1890); cf. NY Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 
413 U.S. 405, 421 (1973). 
 144  OHRP 2018, supra note 25. 
Further clarifying its domain, HHS states that its duty is to oversee and “protect human 
subjects in biomedical and behavioral research.” OHRP, History, 
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/about-ohrp/history/index.html.   
 145  Roberts v. United States, 44 Ct. Cl. 411 (Fed. Cl. 1909). 
 146  Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
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and Behavioral Research147 imposes on HHS/OHRP the duty to regulate 
entities engaged in “biomedical and behavioral research involving human 
subjects”148 and provides guidance regarding “biomedical or behavioral 
research involving human subjects.”149  Section 289(a) provides for 
‘“Institutional Review Board[s] to review biomedical and behavioral 
research involving human subjects.”150  Further, 42 U.S.C. § 300v-v-1 
created the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research,151 and directed the Presidential 
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical 
and Behavioral Research152 to investigate “medicine or biomedical or 
behavioral research”153 and report on “the protection of human subjects of 
biomedical or behavioral research.”154  The scope is clear.  Therefore, even 
if OHRP preferred a more expansive concept of “research” or to regulate 
more forms of scholarship and academic inquiry, it would not have the 
legal authority to do so. 
Some IRBs believe that since the Common Rule obligates them to 
minimize risks to human research subjects, IRBs can review any activity 
that could harm a person who is the “subject” of a journalistic, historical, or 
other creative work.155  This includes the emotional or reputational harm 
from revealing unflattering or embarrassing personal information or asking 
about traumatic events.156  This is incorrect.157  Not only does it invert the 
protections that the Code imposes on covered “research” into a test for 
“research,” but it also disregards the definitions of “human subject,” 
“research,” and “private information.” 
 
 
 
 147  42 U.S.C. §§ 201-205. 
 148  42 U.S.C. § 289(a). 
 149  42 U.S.C. § 289(b)(1). 
 150  42 U.S.C. § 289(a). 
 151  Report by National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical 
and Behavioral Research, on Institutional Review Boards, September 1, 1978. 
 152  42 U.S.C. § 300v-1 et seq. 
 153  42 U.S.C. § 300v-1(a)(2). 
 154  42 U.S.C. § 300v-1(c), § 300v-1 (a)(1) (E)(i); (a)(2)). 
 155  See research cited at notes 15–21. 
 156  SCHRAG, supra note 3, at 164; Kathryn A. Becker-Blease & Jennifer J. Freyd, 
Research Participants Telling the Truth About Their Lives: The Ethics of Asking and Not 
Asking About Abuse, 61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 218, 221–23 (2006).  Studies dispute the notion 
that asking questions about trauma re-traumatizes people; Rather, it is the event itself that 
traumatizes.  One study reported that “no participants reported adverse reactions” to 
questions, even when subjects reported some discomfort, they found talking about the event 
and taking control of their narrative helpful. 
 157  See OHRP, Fed. Reg. (July 2018). 
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As OHRP recently explained, if an activity is not Common Rule 
“research,” it is not covered by the Common Rule, and its protections do 
not apply.158  In turn, limiting perceived harm from that uncovered activity 
is not relevant.  Nonetheless, courts have repeatedly held that the First 
Amendment rights of creators, writers, and journalists prevail over an 
individual’s claim of emotional distress or embarrassment from being 
portrayed unflatteringly in such works.159 
This also misconstrues what a “human subject” is.  “Human subject” 
does not mean that a person is the subject matter of scholarship, journalism, 
a case study, or creative work.  Instead, it means “a living individual about 
whom an investigator conduct[s] research”160 and obtains “private 
information” as enumerated in the Code.161  Quite simply, if there is no 
Common Rule research, there can be no “human subjects.”  Similarly, 
“private information” is not a synonym for “personal information,”162 but is 
“information about behavior that occurs in a context in which an individual 
can reasonably expect that no observation or recording is taking place, 
and . . . can reasonably expect will not be made public.”163  A person 
disclosing information in an interview or in the presence of others 
reasonably understands it might be shown or disclosed.  Therefore, by 
definition, it is not private information.164  In fact, it is generally 
 
 158  Id.  Consequently, that an activity could diminish “individuals’ reputations, and 
deliberately expose the individuals to public scrutiny or even possible harm, such as losing 
their positions or employment,” does not bring it within the purview of an IRB.  Id.  OHRP, 
Fed. Reg. (July 2018). 
 159  Candelaria v. Spurlock, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51595 (E.D.N.Y. July 3, 2008); 
Aronson v. Dog Eat Dog Films, 738 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (W.D. Wash. 2010); Hamburger, 
supra note 1, at 134 (providing no legal claims countenanced for mere embarrassment); see 
also (government may not censor speech based on belief that it is “too harmful,” U.S. v. 
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992), or 
emotionally-distressing, Reed v. Town of Gilbert 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015), to its targets and 
those who hear it. 
 160  45 CFR § 46.102(e)(1). 
 161  45 CFR § 46.102(e)(4)–(5). 
 162  See generally Patricia Sanchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 
21 HARV. J. L, & TECH. 1, 17–18 (2007) (explaining that current privacy doctrine protects 
actions in a private spaces). 
 163  45 CFR § 46.102(e)(1)(ii)(4).  This tracks comparable state-based privacy 
protections.  States that protect similar privacy rights require the plaintiff to be secluded or 
in a place where they reasonably believe they cannot be seen or heard. See Ruth Gavison, 
Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L. J, 421, 428–29 (1980) (explaining that privacy 
requires solitude, anonymity, and secrecy); see, e.g., Johnson v. Allen, 613 S.E.2d 657 (Ga. 
Ct. App 2005) (video surveillance in restroom); Sabrina W. v. Willman, 540 N.W.2d 364 
(Neb. Ct. App. 1995 (intrusion into tanning booth); Placement of secret audio transmitter 
and camera in doctor’s home. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (1971). 
 164  Peruto v. ROC Nation, 386 F. Supp. 3d 471 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (holding that plaintiff 
speaking to interviewer and being video-recorded for television documentary series, could 
not reasonably believe he was not being recorded and that conversation would not be used); 
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permissible to record individuals in public—wherever they reasonably 
expect to be seen or heard—without their consent,165 and even when 
embarrassing.166 
Absent these limitations, when it comes to the activities, individual 
rights, and potential legal liabilities discussed here, the notion that review 
by lay people is superior to that of experts in the profession and courts is 
spurious at best.167  First, IRB members have no expertise in law,168 and 
often misconstrue it.169  Second, they lack the collective background 
necessary to evaluate or appropriately modify these undertakings.170  This 
can also be damaging.  When an institutional authority deems itself the 
arbiter of non-Common Rule activities, IRB “approval” implies that the 
undertaking has been vetted and is, in some broad sense, permissible.  If 
not, then what did the IRB approve?  Such approval, however, confers no 
such protection, but, instead, a misplaced sense of security.  In fact, when 
an IRB changes legally sound consent forms and waivers into IRB-
approved Informed Consent,171 a faculty, who may have been operating 
safely within the bounds of law, has now unknowingly sacrificed protection 
from tort liability.172 
 
Mayhall v. Dennis Stuff, Inc., 31 MLR 1567 (2002) (stating that flashing breasts at a 
concert, at a privately-owned venue, is a public act, and a photo or video taken of the 
flashed bare breasts does not reveal private information). 
 165  Candelaria v. Spurlock, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51595 (E.D.N.Y. July 3, 2008); 
Wilkins v. NBC, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (CA. Ct. App. 1999); Mayhall, 31 MLR 1567. 
 166  Schulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 18 Cal.4th 200, 231–32 (CA. Sup. Ct. 
1998); Wehling v. CBS, 721 F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Boddie v. Am. Broad. 
Co., 694 F. Supp. 1304 (N.D. Oh. 1989) (stating that Congress did not intend wiretap 
statutes and similar state laws to be used against journalists surreptitiously recording 
conversations that result in news stories that embarrass speaker). 
 167  See SCHNEIDER, supra note 2 at 67–69.  
 168  See SCHNEIDER, supra note 2 at 67–69. 
 169  See SCHNEIDER, supra note 2 at 67–69. 
 170  45 C.F.R. § 46.107 requires IRB members to possess expertise and competencies in 
the biological/ biomedical and social sciences.  
 171  IRBs sometimes make changes to informed consent forms that render them 
substantively incorrect and non-compliant.  KLITZMAN, supra note 2, at 134–41; Schneider, 
supra note 1, at 74, 88–90 (recounting studies that found multiple errors in IRB-revised 
informed consent forms); SCHRAG, supra note 3, at 162–63 (reporting instances where IRBs 
changes to informed consent and waiver forms rendered them less accurate, more difficult to 
comprehend or read, omitted required sections, or potentially violated the privacy rights of 
the mentally-disabled). 
 172  Although the law permits liability waivers, the Regulations’ Informed Consent 
provisions do not permit a researcher or institution to require a “human subject” of 
“research” to waive claims of liability.  Hence, any IRB-approved Informed Consent form 
would need to excise such waivers. 
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VI. RAMIFICATIONS OF IMPROPER REVIEW 
Whether due to misunderstanding, negligence, or a misguided sense 
of duty, the failure of IRBs to abide by the Common Rule has 
consequences for not only the faculty and scholarly pursuits wrongly 
regulated, but also for the universities and individual board members that 
improperly regulate them.  This section provides a general overview of 
potential liabilities in order to rebuff the notion that reviewing more 
activity than is covered by the Regulations provides more protection. 
A. First Amendment Concerns 
When an IRB overreaches into speech, creative activity, and 
expression (documentary filmmaking, historical interviewing, journalism, 
etc.), it implicates the First Amendment.173  Public universities, and by 
extension their IRBs, are government actors, who must abide by the First 
Amendment.174  The First Amendment prohibits the government from 
“restrict[ing] expression because of its messages, ideas, its subject matter, 
or its content.”175  Among the limitations found unconstitutional are: 
requiring a permit or license to speak,176 punishing speakers afterwards,177 
disfavoring certain subjects,178 or censoring content because it is deemed 
“too harmful”179 or emotionally-distressing.180  These restrictions “operate 
 
 173  The Common Rule covers the conduct of research on people, albeit where questions 
may be a mechanism of that research, but it does not cover “non-research” speech.  James 
Weinstein, Symposium: Censorship and Institutional Review Board: Institutional Review 
Boards and the Constitution, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 493, 494, 505–06 (2007) (clarifying that 
the Regulations are triggered not by asking humans questions, but by using human subjects 
in research).  Therefore, whereas regulating the use of humans in biomedical, behavioral, 
and social science research does not implicate the First Amendment. Barry McDonald, 
Government Regulation and Other “Abridgements” of Scientific Research: The Proper 
Scope of Judicial Review Under the First Amendment, 54 EMORY L. J. 979, 1018–19 (2005); 
Weinstein, supra note 173, at 522–23, suggests that limiting traditional interviewing and 
journalistic techniques does, and is, therefore, constitutionally suspect.   
 174  As this article focuses on whether certain activities are “research” requiring IRB 
review, a detailed analysis of the First Amendment implications of improper review is 
beyond its scope. This section is meant only to underscore the ramifications of improper 
review.  
 175  Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002).   
 176  Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc’y of NY v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 165–
66 (2002). 
 177  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267 (1964); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 
395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969). 
 178  Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017); U.S. v. Playboy, 529 U.S. 803, 813 
(2000). 
 179  U.S. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 460 (2010); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 
(1992). 
 180  Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 2218, 2226 (2015). 
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at different points in the speech process.”181 
As applied to IRB review of uncovered expressive activity, the IRB 
approval process is quite literally the government licensing speech.182  
Faculty may not commence “research” unless and until the IRB issues an 
approval or has had a chance to censor it.  The First Amendment forbids 
such “speech approval” procedures and presumes them unconstitutional.183  
Additionally, an official restriction of speech prior to publication is a prior 
restraint, long recognized to be the least tolerable infringement on First 
Amendment rights and presumed unconstitutional.184  Thus, when an IRB 
restricts speech, either by limiting the questions posed and topics broached 
in interviews or by censoring or prohibiting the publication of the resulting 
article, film, or video, it constitutes a prior restraint.185 
Regarding the content of the speech itself, the First Amendment 
forbids the government from prohibiting speech simply because it finds the 
underlying or expressed ideas offensive or disagreeable.186  When an IRB 
prohibits or punishes speech, or the resulting speech products and creative 
works, due to the subject matter, it is exactly this type of content-based 
restriction.  Indeed, the First Amendment “underwrites the freedom . . . to 
create [film] in the realm of thought and speech.”187 
These restrictions also implicate academic freedom,188 which is a 
“transcendent value” and special concern of the First Amendment.189  
Although courts have interpreted academic freedom somewhat 
differently190—whether it is understood as a right possessed by 
 
 181  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 336 (2010). 
 182  Hamburger, supra note 1, at 311–12; Schneider, supra note 1, at 200. 
 183  Watchtower Bible v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 167 (2002). 
 184  Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 733 
(1931); Hamburger , supra note 1, at 312–13. 
 185  McDonald, supra note 173, at 993; James Weinstein, Symposium: Censorship and 
Institutional Review Board: Institutional Review Boards and the Constitution, 101 NW. U. 
L. Rev. 493, 494, 505–06 (2007). 
 186  Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 
514 (1969). 
 187  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, at slip op. 57. 
 188  Although Justice Douglas first articulated academic freedom in a dissent, Adler v. 
BOE City of New York, 342 U.S. 485, 508 (1952), he later spoke of it as a settled first 
amendment shield against the state’s control of public education, Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 
U.S. 54, 62 (1967). 
 189  Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978); Keyishian v. 
Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).  The Court has sometimes discussed academic 
freedom as a variant of the First Amendment. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 
250 (1957) (distinguishing “academic freedom” from general first amendment right of 
political expression.). 
 190  William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in the 
Supreme Court of the United States, 52 L. & CONTEMPORARY PROB., 79 (1990). 
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institutions,191 or extending to faculty vis-à-vis their universities192—
improper IRB limitation and censorship directly impacts academic inquiry 
and creation. 
B. Private Universities as Government Actors 
Although the First Amendment applies to government restrictions on 
speech, it can sometimes extend to private actors.193  When a private entity 
exercises powers on behalf of or that are “traditionally the exclusive 
prerogative of the State,”194 or demonstrates “a sufficiently close nexus 
between the State and the challenged action [of a private entity] . . . , the 
action of the [private entity] may be fairly treated as that of the State 
itself.”195  In such instances, the private entity effectively is engaged in 
governmental action.196  For example, the Second Circuit held that a private 
organization’s review committee operating pursuant to, and following a 
decision-making process governed largely by federal guidelines, constitutes 
state action.197 
IRBs at private universities are mandated by, operated pursuant to, 
and duty-bound to the Federal Code.  More than that, they are part of the 
federal government’s regulatory system for human subject research 
oversight.  Thus, when an IRB at a private university decides under the 
Common Rule, it becomes a government official, and its decisions are 
functionally those of the government.  Consequently, an IRB at a private 
 
 191  Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311–12. 
 192  Sweezy, 354 U.S. 234; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003). 
 193  Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351-53; see Ponce v. Basketball Fed’n, 
760 F.2d 375, 377 (1st Cir. 1985); Tynecki v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Dental Med., 875 F. Supp. 
26, 31 (D. Mass. 1994); Kraemer v. Heckler, 737 F.2d 214, 220 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 194  Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353. 
 195  Id. at 351; see also Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004, 1005 (1982) (identifying 
key components courts must consider in assessing the action). 
 196  Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353; Ponce, 760 F.2d at 377; Tynecki., 875 F. Supp. at 31 
(holding that the decision of a utilization review committee may be state action where the 
“decision-making process itself appears to be governed largely” by federal guidelines). In 
such instances, private entities can become liable for First Amendment infringements. 
Kraemer, 737 F.2d at 220; Catanzano v. Dowling, 60 F.3d 113, 117 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding 
state action where private home care providers were required to make certain decisions 
under the statutory and regulatory scheme). 
 197  Kraemer, 737 F.2d at 220; see also Catanzano, 60 F.3d at 117 (finding state action 
where private home care providers were required to make certain decisions under the 
statutory and regulatory scheme).  To determine whether a private actor may be found to be 
a state actor, courts must examine: (1) whether there is a sufficient nexus between the state 
and the private actor which compels the private actor to act as it did; (2) whether the private 
actor assumes a traditionally public function; or (3) whether there is a sufficient “symbiotic 
relationship” between the state and the private actor so that the state might be recognized as 
a joint participant in the challenged activity. Ponce, 760 F.2d at 377; Tynecki, 875 F. Supp. 
at 31. 
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university engages in state action and the First Amendment applies.198 
C. Board Member Liability 
Because states and state entities, such as universities, enjoy sovereign 
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment,199 they can be sued only where 
law expressly permits it.200  Typically, this immunity extends to agents 
legitimately acting on behalf of the state, such as when state employees 
make or implement policies and decisions.201  In practice, this means that as 
long as those individuals are acting within the scope of their authority “as 
the state,” they are personally immune from lawsuit for the formulation of  
“plans, policies, or designs.”202 
This protection, however, is not absolute.  While the exact boundaries 
differ somewhat depending on state law (that is, a state’s law abrogating 
immunity and permitting suit), individuals are typically not immune when 
acting “beyond [their] authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the 
law,” or “willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, [or] in bad faith.”203  When 
IRBs review, prohibit, or punish activity not covered by the Common Rule, 
they are not only violating the Code, but also acting beyond their authority.  
In turn, those actions are beyond the scope of any immunity they otherwise 
enjoy.  Accordingly, they may be held individually liable.204 
D. Compromising Federal-Wide Assurance Systems 
Finally, an IRB’s failure to follow the Code and overreach into “non-
research” jeopardizes an institution’s Common Rule compliance, as well as 
the validity of the formal assurances it must file with the federal agency.205  
The federal-wide assurance system (“FWA”) is constructed on and requires 
each institution to file a written “Assurance of Compliance”206 with the 
 
 198  Chung-Lin Chen, Constitutional Analysis of Research Ethics Review Laws: The 
United States and Beyond, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 248, 250 (2015) (“Where the 
ethics review requirement is compelled by law, the constitutional concern of free research 
arises.”). 
 199  U.S. Const. amend. XI. 
 200  Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (acknowledging sovereign immunity but 
holding that state can be sued for constitutional violations); 1946 Federal Tort Claims Act, 
28 U.S.C. § 2674 (waiving immunity under certain circumstances). 
 201  Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 405 (Ala. 2000). 
 202  Id. 
 203  Id.  In other words, if a state agent acts contrary to or outside of the bounds of the 
state-based authority, they are no longer acting as the state, and are not covered by the 
state’s protection. 
 204  See Lynch, supra note 68, at 145–46, 154 (noting that some human subjects research 
litigation has named IRBs and individual board members as defendants). 
 205  45 C.F.R. §§ 46.102–103. 
 206   Institutions must file with Office of Human Research Protections an “Assurance of 
PODLAS(DO NOT DELETE) 4/4/2020  1:58 AM 
282 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 44:2 
Department of Health and Human Services confirming that it complies 
with the Common Rule and its covered “research” is conducted consistent 
with a statement of ethical principles.207  This is not a mere formality, but 
also means to hold universities accountable. 
By definition, an IRB reviewing activities that are not “research” is 
not following the Code, at least some of the time.  Consequently, any 
FWAs or Assurances of Common Rule compliance an IRB issues are not 
credible or objectively false, at least some of the time.  Independent of this, 
when the IRB responsible for ensuring compliance either refuses to follow 
or is so ignorant of the Common Rule’s terms that it cannot discern to what 
it applies, substantively that IRB’s decisions lack validity.  Such procedural 
and substantive issues may render the resulting FWAs invalid, and the 
university noncompliant. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Misunderstandings about the Common Rule and what qualifies as 
“research involving human subjects” have long permitted IRBs to 
improperly restrict a variety of scholarly, professional, and creative 
activities.  The 2018 Code and HHS publications now make clear that 
undertakings such as journalistic and legal investigation, non-fiction 
filmmaking and writing, and biographical and oral history interviewing, 
typically are not “research,” and, therefore, do not require IRB approval.  
Indeed, IRBs have no legal authority to review these undertakings, and 
doing so can threaten a university’s federal research compliance and 
funding, and even expose it and its IRB to legal liability. 
Nonetheless, these recent amendments and publications cannot be 
expected to automatically enlighten faculty, especially considering that 
they have long been ignored or misread.  Rather, IRBs must implement 
these changes through their policies and submission practices, and faculty 
must stop submitting, both literally and figuratively, to IRBs.  In the past, 
faculty may have found it easier to yield to an IRB’s misguided claim of 
authority, but this neither bestowed protection upon faculty nor 
universities, instead only perpetuating the problem.  To the extent that 
faculty and academic organizations felt ill-equipped to challenge IRB 
overreach, this article hopes to be a resource.  It lays out the central 
misunderstanding about “research,” explains what is and is not “human 
subject” “research” requiring approval and supports its notions with 
annotations and citations to relevant Code provisions, HHS/OHRP 
publications, and court opinions.  The article also anticipates and dispenses 
 
Compliance,” 45 C.F.R. §46.103(a), (f), or a Federal-Wide Assurance, 45 C.F.R.§46.103(a). 
 207  45 C.F.R. § 46.109, §46.111. 
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with alternative justifications for IRB review, and warns of the liabilities 
universities and IRB members face should they refuse to abide by the 
Common Rule. 
 
 
